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Introduction
Th i s  p a p e r  wa s  o r i g i n a l l y delivered at and published by an 
International Peace Conference in Fiji 
in January 1985. It was written long 
before the Canadian War Museum 
was forced to debate the question 
of the most appropriate manner in 
which the contribution of Canadians 
in Bomber Command should  be 
addressed. My interest in the subject 
was not to pronounce on the morals 
of the bombing of civilians, but to 
try to pinpoint some of the thinking 
that characterized the attitude of the 
Royal Air Force and Englishmen and 
Canadians and their governments 
towards the campaign. As the paper 
shows,  the Canadians were a part of 
the Royal Air Force. Quite apart from 
integration of the Royal Canadian 
Air Force into the British service, the 
Canadian air force had not the means 
or capacity to deliver, by itself, a blow 
that would have crippled anything 
significant in Germany. I think that 
crews were surprised by the now 
very controversial Dresden Raid of 
February 1945, but they did not object 
to doing it. My reference to Kurt 
Vonnegut’s account of the Dresden 
raid is not an endorsement of him, 
but a deliberate use of his novelistic 
skill to focus attention when I was in 
Fiji as a lecturer among an unknown 
audience.
 When I began the paper I saw it as 
an attempt  to ask where the bomber 
offensive had come from,  aside 
from the obvious one of tit for tat. 
The paper traces the development of 
the strategic bombing idea  through 
references to the First World War, 
British air operations in the Middle 
East in the 1920s, and the Spanish war 
of 1936-9, and especially by reference 
to the French airman and author 
Antoine de St. Exupéry. I do ask the 
question  “what for,” but  that does 
not imply any scholarly endorsement 
of “Don’t let’s be beastly to the 
Germans” as Noel Coward wittily put 
it as some sort of theological point. 
That was not my idea then, nor is it 
now.
 The fact is that any debate over 
how much force should be applied 
at any time, in the middle of a war, 
especially the Second World War, 
implies a luxury of means that we 
(Sir Arthur Harris) did not have. 
My paper shows that. Harris, that 
determined figure, kept himself and 
his force just ahead of the Luftwaffe 
and its ground support. My paper, 
dealing so much with attitude, just 
manages to include that fact. It 
could, perhaps, be argued that more 
resources ought to have gone to the 
navy. I do not argue it but as a naval 
historian the idea has attractions 
for me. On the other hand the idea 
that the invasion of France would 
have been successful, or that it 
could even have been undertaken 
without Bomber Command  seems 
wrong to me. My opinion is that 
without Harris’s successes the war 
would have had a much more 
wearing conclusion, to put it mildly. 
Harris said, as I note in the  paper, 
that bombers won it. Surely they 
did. However the moralists raise 
important questions. The problem 
is that war is, as James Wolfe put it, 
“an option of difficulties.” To debate 
those difficulties is possible, it is not 
possible to ignore them.  Moral high 
ground is a hard place to find in war. 
However, Richard Overy’s careful 
book Why the Allies Won, comes 
closest to supplying the fine print for 
my generalizations.
* * * * *
Abstract: This paper is an account 
by a historian, who participated in 
the bombing of Germany (1944-45), 
of attitudes towards the campaign 
on the part of military personnel at 
the time and since. It examines the 
attitudes of the British Government 
and their military, and comments on 
the way historians have responded to 
the evidence since 1945. The problem 
of responsibility and justification is 
presented in some of its aspects. The 
treatment is a mixture of the personal 
and the professional.
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Certainly the most provocative book about mass bombing in the 
Second World War was written by the 
American novelist Kurt Vonnegut. 
It was about Dresden, and entitled 
Slaughterhouse Five.1 In it he quotes 
two military men commenting on 
the raid on Dresden as presented 
in the book by David Irving on the 
same subject.2 They were Lieutenant-
General Ira C. Eaker, USAF retired 
and Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, 
KCB, KBE, DFC, AFC. He begins with 
Eaker:
I find it difficult to understand 
Englishmen or Americans who weep 
about enemy civilians who were 
killed but who have not shed a tear 
for our gallant crews lost in combat 
with a cruel enemy…I think it would 
have been well for Mr. Irving to have 
remembered, when he was drawing 
the frightful picture of the civilians 
killed at Dresden, that V-1s and V-2s 
were at that very time falling on 
England, killing civilian men, women 
and children indiscriminately, as 
they were designed and launched 
to do. It might be well to remember 
Buchenwald and Coventry too.
As Vonnegut repeatedly says, ‘So it 
goes.’
 What Air Marshal Saundby said, 
among other things, was this:
That the bombing of Dresden 
was a great tragedy none can 
deny. That it really was a military 
necessity, few, after reading 
this book, will believe. It was 
one of those terrible things that 
sometimes happen in wartime, 
brought about by an unfortunate 
combination of circumstances. 
Those who approved it were 
neither wicked nor cruel, though 
it may well be that they were too 
remote from the harsh realities 
of war to understand fully the 
appalling destructive power of 
air bombardment in the spring 
of 1945.
‘So it goes.’3 
Vonnegut later introduces this 
dialogue: 
‘Americans have finally heard 
about Dresden,’ said Rumfoord 
[a would-be military historian] 
twenty-three years after the raid. ‘A 
lot of them know now how much 
worse it was than Hiroshima. So 
I’ve got to put something about it 
in my book. From the official Air 
Force standpoint, it’ll all be new.’
‘Why would they keep it a secret 
so long?’ said Lily.
‘For fear that a lot of bleeding 
hearts,’ said Rumfoord, ‘might 
not think it was such a wonderful 
thing to do.’
It was now that Billy Pilgrim spoke 
up intelligently.
‘I was there,’ he said.4
I was there too.
 A subject that is cross-disciplinary 
and one that takes an historian 
outside his accustomed accumulative 
and clinical or analytical roles invites 
caution. However, it is my view 
that it may be wise to let emotional 
overtones ply more freely than is 
customary with historical papers if we 
are to get more balanced assessments 
RAF Lancasters bomb through cloud.
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from our consultations with the past. 
Furthermore, it may be wise to look 
at the consequences of having great 
technological capacities lying ready 
to hand in times of desperation. What 
military men, politicians, and indeed 
populations do in these circumstances 
seems to me to be eminently worthy 
of discussion in this nuclear age. 
Indeed, it may be that the history of a 
non-nuclear age may have something 
to teach this present time. Finally, it 
should be said that this paper does 
not search for scapegoats. It is not a 
rush to judgment.  Questioning the 
effects of the bomber campaign, and 
the origins of its programmes, ought 
not to be construed as an attack on 
the participants, certainly not on the 
motives of my surviving friends or 
those of our dead comrades. Hitler’s 
Reich seemed to me then, as it does 
now, to have been an infamous 
political horror. I did not regard my 
own country or the United Kingdom, 
or even the United States in this 
light then, nor do I now. However, 
as for old veterans who look at any 
attempt to discuss their past as an 
attack on some sort of Holy Grail, 
and who regard criticism as some 
sort of treason, I have nothing to say 
except that it is 40 years on, and a new 
generation must be served.
 On the other hand I have some 
right to speak. I was a member of 
the mass bombing forces in the war 
against Hitler. I was at Dresden, 
overhead on its night of terror.5 
I have had my face slapped by a 
German woman who was a victim 
of bombing when she learned what 
I had done. My daughter-in-law 
was born of German parents. I have 
had German students. I have also 
taught the history of the so-called 
“Strategic Bombing Offensive” to 
graduate and undergraduate since 
1962. I was also a friend of one of the 
few British people with the courage 
to denounce mass bombing when 
it took place. Both during the war 
and after it Captain (later Sir) Basil 
Liddell Hart denounced this, what 
he regarded as a retrograde method 
of warfare.6 I have remembered with 
some sense of frustrated misgiving 
my own part in it. On the other hand 
I still remember my own comrades 
with affection, and I attended a 
reunion of my own bomber “crew” 
in 1984. I do differ from supporters 
of the bombing offensive in that I 
do not resent present day attacks on 
it because some of my friends were 
killed carrying it out. Finally, I have 
made some attempt to keep up with 
the burgeoning historical literature 
on the subject. After all I am an 
historian by profession.
 But I would not undervalue the 
usefulness of having a participant 
trained, as an historian, consider 
this matter. On a topic like this one 
is inclined to get views on air war 
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US Army Air Force heavy bombers drop high explosive and incendiary bombs on Dresden, 15 February 1945.
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from people who have had no direct 
connection with it, except that they 
have developed, in these tense times, 
a sense of immediacy about the 
need to control war from the air; or 
conversely, one gets talks from those 
who want to justify the use of air threat 
as a deterrent, and who are associated 
in some way with the development of 
public military policy. Both kinds of 
activists have laudable objectives. I 
am different only in that my present 
sense of immediacy comes from 
my memory of past involvement 
as a very ordinary participant and 
this experience is filtered through 
subsequent professional study as the 
facts have became more generally 
available.
 Let us go back in time. During 
the war, of course, every airman who 
could think had some idea of what 
we were doing. Nobody was much 
fooled by talk concerning military 
targets around which civilian houses 
“just happened” to be grouped 
making it unavoidable that some of 
them would get the odd stray bomb. I 
sometimes thought about that, as did 
most of us. However, we were very 
young and we thought it a good idea 
at the time to kill Germans. We also 
had it in mind that the British had had 
a good dose of bombing in 1940-41. 
Some people knew about the German 
bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam. 
It was retaliation. We also knew 
that on our squadron (in 1945) there 
lingered the ghosts of those who had 
perfected the system back in 1943, 
and they were not simply retired 
from operations, they were retired 
from life.7 We were not mindful of 
those ghosts, whom our ground 
crews had known personally, when 
we set out on trips.8 Furthermore, 
there was the fact that the opposition 
was still there, even in the winter of 
1945, with real anti-aircraft fire and 
real night-fighters to greet those who 
thought the war was over. Finally, 
I freely admit to strong feelings of 
satisfaction with the intelligently 
deployed techniques of Bomber 
Command generally, and with the 
personal and practical performance 
of my own crew in particular.
 When it ended and we got on the 
boat for Canada, Bomber Harris came 
to say good-bye. He said to us in the 
mess on the Empress of Something or 
other, that “when we came to dandle 
our children on our knee, and they 
asked ‘what did you do in the last 
war, daddy?’ you can tell them that 
you won it, because you did.”
 In my case, for the moment, the 
war ended there. The university that 
was to be my life gobbled up my 
time. I did think about the war from 
time to time. A “sincere” but juvenile 
essay on the bombing of Dresden 
got me a well-deserved D+ from my 
English professor. I took the hint 
and majored in history. Later I went 
to England again, in a new capacity, 
that of a research student in history. 
During my time in Cambridge I read 
the reports of the Nazi atrocities 
written up for the Nuremburg trials 
until I was too disgusted to read 
more. It did, then, occur to me 
more strongly that bombing women 
and children was not too civilized 
an occupation. I noticed also that 
Bomber Command did not seem 
to be receiving the accolades that a 
successful and decisive campaign 
seemed to demand. What was the 
matter with us? As I began to think 
Air Vice-Marshal C.M. “Black Mike” 
McEwen (right), the commander of 6 
Group RCAF, prepares for a flight in a 
Lancaster.
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about it, it seemed that there were 
three central questions. Who ordered 
it? Was it right? What good did it do 
for the war effort? These are still very 
difficult questions. At one level, of 
course, Harris ordered it, but a little 
reflection makes it clear that he did 
not rule the British Cabinet. Generally 
speaking the moral question, then 
as now, was sluffed off on the basis 
of the notion that it was total war, 
and after all, it was comfortably but 
uncritically held, the Germans began 
the bombing. This was denied by 
Liddell Hart.9 Practically speaking it 
was held to have been essential for 
eventual victory. Many intelligent 
people believed this then, and they 
believe it still. The question of my 
own responsibility I have lived with, 
as have all the surviving members of 
the Bomber Force then and now, some 
more successfully than others.10 Some 
of us are not such passionate devotees 
of pursuing every “war criminal” as 
others have been. 
 I  got down to reading the 
evidence. What was the evidence? 
There was F.J.P. Vale’s  Advance to 
Barbarism,11 in which the whole 
concept of unrestricted warfare 
against civilians was presented as 
a return to the days before war had 
any rules at all, any code, or any 
of what might be called the Red 
Cross mentality. The whole thing 
was indicated as a policy which the 
British and the Americans had been 
perfectly willing to execute, and 
did, despite the fact that it was a 
barbarous way to make war. Another 
book that became available then 
was Hans Rumpf’s The Bombing of 
Germany.12 Rumpf had been a German 
urban survival expert, who, as 
professionally and dispassionately as 
he could, chronicled what happened 
to Germany from the underneath 
person’s point of view. When I 
finished reading Rumpf I could no 
longer be horrified by tales of frying 
flesh. As I had discovered before 
in reading the Nuremburg trials 
documents, the human mind can 
only take in so much horror reading. 
Many people seem to have had a 
similar reaction to such compulsive 
and detailed fact-finding.13
 However, help was at hand for 
confused airmen like me. Books on the 
bomber offensive began to surface. As 
mentioned, Hans Rumpf’s book came 
on the market giving the picture 
from the enemy on the ground. The 
four-volume official history, entitled 
The Strategic Air Offensive against 
Germany was published by Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, over the 
signatures of Noble Frankland and 
Sir Charles Webster.14 Also, in 1962 
R.H.S. Crossman, the British Labour 
M.P., wrote in Esquire of his horror 
at what had happened at Dresden - 
of how an innocent, non-industrial 
town was flattened and treated to 
The pilot and bomb-aimer of a 428 
Squadron Lancaster stand beneath the 
open bomb bay of their aircraft prior to 
an attack on an oil refinery in the Ruhr in 
late 1944. The short range to the target 
allowed a full load to be carried, in this 
case 500-pound, high explosive, general 
purpose bombs.
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round the clock bombing by both 
the Americans and us, and how a 
firestorm had made the old historic 
city one vast flaming coffin.15 It had, 
it turned out, happened before at 
Hamburg.16 However, Hamburg was 
an important port. Crossman was an 
indignant man, and he was interested 
in assigning responsibility. Perhaps 
this Labour politician was aiming at 
Churchill?
 In any event I had some idea of 
what the issues were, and of what the 
recipients on the ground thought of 
it all. When David Irving’s book on 
Dresden came out, I was advanced 
enough in knowledge that he did not 
tell me anything significant that I had 
not known before. The exact casualty 
figures are still disputed. Estimates of 
the Dresden dead have been put up 
to over 200,000, and down to about 
30,000.17 Every dead man counts in 
Heaven’s scheme of things, but the 
numbers game does not alter the 
moral problem, does it? In all the war 
Bomber Command lost some 50,000 
men.
 Almost immediately after the 
war in 1945 the Americans conducted 
and published most of the results of a 
survey of strategic bombing.18 It has 
since been expanded and amplified 
with comment by David MacIsaac.19 
As Middlebrook and Everitt indicate, 
it is surprising that with the full 
and intact records available nothing 
similar has ever been attempted 
for Bomber Command.20 Whatever 
the reason for this, it had the result 
that as Chester Wilmot’s 1952 book, 
The Struggle for Europe21 set the 
boundaries for the general European 
strategic debate for the next 30 years, 
so the American bombing survey 
established American credentials as 
specialized bombing experts almost 
by default. Recently, the Ultra part of 
that body of information has become 
available22 and from this source 
it can be seen that the dominant 
power of American “strategic” 
bombing is founded largely on the 
immediate speculations of American 
air propagandists. The idea that its 
precision capacities were highly 
developed seems to have been 
meekly accepted by many Americans. 
English and other air historians 
have not strongly questioned this 
idea.23 It is important to note that 
this does not involve an argument 
between advocates of precision 
bombing and area bombing at the 
core. It is really an argument that 
American air forces flying to targets 
that the Germans perceived as vital 
or strategic, invited air combat, and 
from that would flow “command of 
the air” consequent on the decimation 
of the fighter section of the Luftwaffe. 
Referring to the “Ultra” report24 it is 
extraordinary how arguments about 
command of the air over Germany are 
interspersed with arguments about 
how this fight over Germany took air 
command away from the Luftwaffe 
on the Russian Front. Furthermore, 
German speculation about the effect 
of particular raids is meshed with 
American speculations about the 
same things: that is to say, if a raid was 
supposed to achieve such and such an 
effect is proven to have occurred.25 
Harris, with his photographs of 
night bombing, did better than that 
- he provided evidence of his own 
Command’s limitations as a strike 
force. The United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey (USSBS) had the 
opposite object and achieved what 
it set out to do. Of course the US 
Army Air Forces (USAAF) played a 
large part in stretching the Luftwaffe, 
but so did the Russians, the Royal 
Navy, the Mediterranean Front, 
the Scandinavian Front and, of 
course, the persistent attacks of 
Bomber Command. Quite apart from 
questions of morality and target utility 
it is difficult to determine whether the 
interdiction of parts and fuel moving 
to Luftwaffe squadrons was more 
due to attacks on communications 
centres (cities) than it was to direct 
attacks on refineries and oil fields. 
Cumulatively there can be no doubt 
but that Germany’s pressing need to 
defend its cities contributed to the 
total stretching of German resources 
which was the best help that could 
be given the Russians who were, 
after all, the ones who defeated the 
Wehrmacht. This paragraph is merely 
to show that the argument between 
“precision” and “area” bombing is 
mostly a sham. The only question that 
any moralist or indeed realist can ask, 
once air war and bombing has begun 
is, what determined target selection, 
terror, or military purposes (with 
communications, strategic supplies, 
and the attempt to secure “command 
of the air” over Germany) is included 
in the term ‘military’? The choice was 
not, as will be shown, clear cut. But 
it was largely determined by past 
thinking about bombing policy.
 Who said anything against the 
bombing of Germany during the war? 
I discovered that George Bell, Bishop 
of Chichester, had asked, in the House 
of Lords, what the Government 
thought they were doing at this mass 
bombing game. He was supported 
by Lord Lang, the ex-Archbishop of 
Canterbury in the House of Lords.26 
Bell also carefully distanced himself 
from any idea of attacking the 
bombing of military targets, or of 
the airmen who were the agents of the 
government. But he thought the idea 
that to strike an industry justified the 
obliteration of a city somewhat out 
of proportion. He asked whether or 
not “old German towns” might not 
be next attacked. Archbishop Lord 
Lang supported Bell and argued 
against the tendency to “gloat” 
over the capacity for retaliation, 
which he said, showed “real moral 
deterioration.” Viscount Cranborne, 
replying for the government, denied 
deliberate terror, and promised no 
abatement due to the duty to “our 
own people, their allies, and to the 
world. (Cheers).”27 British member of 
Parliament Richard Stokes also spoke 
out in 1943. He said, among other 
things, “we have forgotten out aim, 
the preservation of civilization.”28 
Similarly, Captain Basil Liddell 
US
 A
ir 
Fo
rc
e 
Ph
ot
o 
57
19
3 
AC
Schurman - Mass Bombing.indd   24 10/6/2009   1:18:05 PM
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss3/4
25
Hart questioned the wisdom of the 
Government’s policy. He thought 
that Churchill should consider that 
bombing (and blockade) “tend to 
leave a deeper scar, and have a more 
degrading effect, on civilized life, 
than what has been experienced 
in any modern war.”29 He thought 
blitzkrieg, conceived as an army-air 
military support system, was humane 
by comparison. This was not his only 
assault on such methods. Writing 
after the war, Liddell Hart stated 
that the mass bombing “inevitably 
produced a deepening danger to 
the relatively shallow foundations 
of civilized life.”30 Neither Bell nor 
Liddell Hart were then popular for 
their views, but both are remembered 
for them now with honour – in some 
quarters.
 All that the proponents of air 
power had to offer was that bombing 
shortened the war by smashing 
industrial targets and specialized 
industries; that the invasion would 
have been impossible without it; and 
by some it was argued that the war 
would have been over if the bombing 
had been supported as a priority 
weapon and Harris had been allowed 
to go all out.31
 Frankland and Webster came 
down on the side of the idea that the 
invasion needed the air support, but 
they refrained from estimating its 
total effect, cautiously stating that the 
bombers produced “indispensable 
military advantages” for the invading 
armies.32 Like Harris himself they 
seem to have been unhappy with 
estimating army support effects. The 
fact was that the bombers were never 
entirely moved from a strategic to an 
army support role. The USSBS, which 
had become available shortly after 
the war, claimed that terror bombing 
was, and had proved to be, much 
more overvalued and that specialized 
target bombing did the most to 
cripple German industry, and bring 
on the final victory.33 Frankland and 
Webster partially agreed with this, 
but claimed that the capability of both 
British and American bombing forces 
precluded pinpoint accuracy before 
1944, when the invasion was made a 
priority for support bombing by the 
Supreme Command and when the 
Norden bombsight became generally 
available to the RAF. Their argument 
was that bombing competence was 
a product of developing skill and 
Concentrating on blasting three railway centres in the Dresden area, 
choke points for the Germans that are headed southeast into the 
mountains, Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of US 8th Air Force blasted 
the target on 17 April 1945 with high explosive bombs.
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technology. Certainly an argument 
that bombers were all that the British 
had to offer in 1942 had strength. 
Heavy bombers had begun to roll off 
the production lines in numbers at 
the precise moment when the British 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan 
was producing crews in numbers, 
and when Churchill felt the greatest 
pressure due to the sinking of the 
Prince of Wales and the Repulse. 
Furthermore the British felt the need 
to offer their new allies something in 
the way of offensive capability. At that 
precise time Harris, not yet chief of 
Bomber Command, was in the United 
States. He was there at the same time 
as the Prime Minister, and he did 
have a plan of attack!34 War is, as 
General Wolfe once put it, an option 
of difficulties.  It was not an open 
option of clear available choices. No 
matter what the consequences, and to 
the very last days of the war, Harris 
stuck to his terror bombing plan.35 He 
was a hard man to convince.
 Harris did have his engaging 
side. This was revealed in his 
unshakeable conviction that in total 
war all means were necessary, and 
that if the Germans had won he 
would have been hanged as a war 
criminal. No doubt! And his crews 
would have been condemned as 
the equivalent of the SS. In a way 
the crews sensed this. It is possible 
that the solidarity of his Command 
in the face of exceptionally heavy 
losses had something to do with 
a sort of complicity in unpleasant 
work. That is a speculation that will 
be unpalatable to many, and nothing 
more than a speculation.36
 There has been no attempt here 
to dwell on the fact that when targets 
were selected in the last months 
of the war it meant devastation on 
German cities were hard hit from the 
air, as these postwar photos of Cologne 
attest.
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a vast scale. It was the scale of the 
destruction in the final months of 
the war that made even Churchill 
recoil somewhat.37 The photos of the 
German cities bombed provide clear 
examples of this. I am not attempting 
to state that the Germans as a people 
did not invite much of what they 
received. Their own methods do not 
bear much close scrutiny. Revenge 
was not, however, the avowed 
purpose of the Allied governments. 
The purpose was to win the war, 
notwithstanding Richard Stokes’ 
remark about “civilization.”38 It is 
more interesting to reflect that for 
almost 15 years after the war the 
number of commentators who even 
raised moral or practical question 
concerning mass bombing in the 
Second World War could be counted 
on the fingers of one hand. Why?
 Partly, no doubt, it was because 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (by the very power 
of destruction in relation to the size 
of the bombs) had obliterated the 
memory of previous methods. Also 
it was due to the fact that, both from 
the point of view of the effectiveness, 
and from the point of view of bomber 
casualties to our own crews, it raised 
unpleasant questions. Winston 
Churchill, no stranger to bearing 
responsibility, felt it necessary to 
duck this burden though privately 
he recognized Harris’ contribution 
to the war effort.39 Yet the restraint 
in public recognition was marked 
by many. Churchill shunned Harris, 
and he avoided a real appraisal of 
the subject in his books. It was clear 
that he was not over-anxious to give 
emphasis to the bombing campaign 
as the war concluded. He stopped the 
official survey from going forward.40 
This is surely not surprising! The 
effect was debatable. Bomber crew 
casualties were in high - 55,000 killed; 
8,403 wounded and 9,838 prisoners 
of war.41 The destructive results 
were horrendous. This was not 
encouraging material for a political 
apologist to work with!
 In this context it must be noted 
that for many years after the war, 
the moral question of whether it was 
right to terror-bomb whole cities was 
not seriously raised. When Harry 
Truman had to make the decision 
about destroying Japanese cities with 
nuclear weapons, he at least had the 
ability to state that he would be able 
to save lives on both sides, even if 
they were American military lives at 
the expense and deaths of Japanese, 
both civilian and military. Churchill 
agreed with Truman. Even Leonard 
Cheshire, the distinguished British 
airman who flew with the Americans 
as an observer, did not object at the 
time.42 Churchill’s use of the bomber 
weapon, although it caused as much 
destruction, did not even have the 
luxury of that clear cut choice. At 
any rate the morality of bombing 
cities in a mass way was never the 
premier question, but I say this in 
the belief that Churchill, if I read 
him at all correctly, must have found 
the choice agonizing. Liddell Hart 
would doubtless have questioned 
this judgment as other historians 
may, on the grounds that it ascribes 
too much in the way of humanist 
scruple to Churchill. This is a subject 
too complex for easy judgment and 
I simply record that this view is 
controversial. What else could he 
wage war with before the Americans 
were invasion-capable?
 Let us pause and go back before 
the war. When the Second World 
War broke out what was to have 
been expected? The Germans had 
used population bombing against 
London in 1916-17 and the results 
were unpleasant. The population was 
nervous.43 The “experts” interpreted 
this to mean that weight of attack 
would smash morale. After the First 
World War it was widely believed by 
air power exponents in the United 
Kingdom that “the bomber would 
always get through” and that the 
terror resulting would swiftly break 
an urban people’s will to resist. This, 
with the Italian Giulio Douhet’s 
theoretical backing, became Royal 
Air Force doctrine.44  The British 
tried it for Imperial policing. If 
peoples in the Arabian Desert, or 
on the North-West frontier of India, 
resisted a call for an apology for some 
“outrage,” then the airmen bombed 
their tents, flocks and waterholes. 
This had an effect that tremendously 
encouraged submission to the forces 
of “civilization.” Airmen remembered 
how effective this had been! Arthur 
Harris was involved in developing 
this  technique,  which offered 
financial and practical advantages, 
in Mesopotamia in 192245 It has 
been suggested in a recent and most 
perceptive study that this testing 
ground was partly responsible for 
not only the survival of the RAF as 
an independent entity, but also for 
its tendency to identify offensive 
capability with the bomber and not 
with a more balanced force.46 It is 
even more remarkable that it was 
Winston Churchill, in his capacity 
as a colonial secretary in the Lloyd 
George coalition government, who 
supported the use of air forces in 
such a way, and that he supported 
it mainly on the grounds of saving 
money and sparing British men. 
Based on this criteria, it was effective. 
It is also interesting to note that 
when reports reached Churchill of 
women and children being strafed 
in a lake where they had withdrawn 
for safety, he condemned the brutality 
without stifling the method.47 The 
first Labour Government did not 
change this money-saving situation, 
although that redoubtable MP George 
Lansbury acted as the conscience of 
the nation when he stated that the Air 
Minister and his department were “ 
the lineal descendents of the Huns,” 
and Cox went on to say:
I know there is a sort of feeling that a 
coloured person is of less value than 
a white person, but I do not think 
so. I think you are baby killers, and 
inhuman baby killers, whether you 
kill a black baby or a white baby. I 
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do not see any difference. I think 
that one is a crime and the other is 
a crime.48
 The point was that terror bombing 
was perceived to work. Charles 
Portal, who was to play a major role 
in the Second World War bombing, 
told the Disarmament Conference at 
Geneva in 1932 
that “criticism of 
police bombing 
w a s  ‘ w e l l 
meaning,  but 
ill-informed.’”49
 When the 
r e a r m a m e n t 
campaign began 
after 1935 it was 
i m m e d i a t e l y 
apparent that 
air would get a 
substantial slice 
of the defence 
budget. In fact 
it got a healthy 
40 percent,  a 
p r o c u r e m e n t 
r a t i o  i t 
m a i n t a i n e d 
until 1945!50 It 
is interesting to 
note that when 
a joint services 
committee was set up in 1936 to study 
defensive measures against enemy 
attack, they credited the German 
air planners with a horrendous 
ruthlessness in respect to air bombing. 
In Manfred Messerschmidt’s yet 
unpublished paper, “Industrialisieter 
Krieg und Volkerrecht in den beiden 
Weltkrieg,” he states that the British 
were programmed to use mass 
bombing in such a way that is not 
accurate to state that it was merely 
a response to an enemy that was 
National Socialist.51 They estimated 
400 tons of bombs a day for two 
weeks would be dumped on the 
United Kingdom in either attempts at 
interdiction of food supplies or terror, 
and on balance they leaned to the 
notion that Germans would favour 
the latter, due to their supposed 
temperament. In 1936 the Joint 
Planning Committee, chaired by 
Arthur Harris, outlined measures to 
defend the UK in event of war with 
Germany, but it refused to assign 
priorities. It opined that without 
the threat of bomber retaliation for 
both terror and interdiction, other 
defence measures would prove to be 
inadequate.52 Three things are to be 
noted here. The first is the evidence 
that if terror was available a foe 
would use it; second, that the best 
antidote was counter-terror, and third 
the underlying assumption was that 
terror would work.
 Of course when the war began, in 
the days before France fell, Bomber 
Command was not able to deliver 
accurate counter-terror attacks, nor 
was the Luftwaffe able to initiate 
them. The bomber argument was 
largely frustrated, to the chagrin of 
the Air leaders, by civilian officials.53 
The priority was switched to the 
marriage of fighters with radar in 
time to allow the “Few” to work 
effectively in the Battle of Britain. 
Meanwhile, as Donald Cameron Watt 
says, trenchantly, “For nearly twenty 
years the Air Force High Command 
had been preaching a strategy of the 
Emperor’s clothes being preferred 
to one of cutting one’s coat to fit the 
available cloth.54
Airmen, in fact, believed what 
they wanted. In Spain the horrors of 
Guernica were 
r e m e m b e r e d , 
but the fact that 
the Republicans 
did not submit 
e a s i l y  t o  a i r 
terror was not. 
The point was 
m a d e  i n  t h e 
Pa r i s  p a p e r s 
b y  t h e  m o s t 
famous French 
aviator of the 
time, Antoine 
de St. Exupéry, 
but it was not 
digested. His 
b i o g r a p h e r 
writes: 
Years  before 
the analysts, 
the statisticians, 
a n d  t h e 
autopsists of 
the Second World War were to 
proclaim what the Goerings and the 
Bomber Harrises were too obtuse 
to understand, what the Curtis 
Lemays and their ilk have never 
been able to fathom. Saint Exupéry 
had put his finger on the pathetic 
futility of mass bombardments. “A 
moral role? But a bombardment is 
self-thwarting. It defeats its very 
purpose. Each shellburst in Madrid 
provokes a gradual hardening. What 
was wobbly indifference stiffens. A 
dead child matters when it is yours. 
A bombardment, it seemed to me, 
does not disperse; it unifies. Horror 
induces a clenching of the fists, a 
closing of ranks in the same shared 
shudder…. Madrid is there, taking 
its blows in silence. But so it is with 
A group of cluster bombs falling towards Hanover, Germany, 25 March 1945.
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man: hardships slowly fortify their 
virtues.”55
 We now look back at Warsaw 
and Rotterdam as moral outrages. 
No doubt; and the Germans were 
capable of much more than that. 
Nevertheless, militarily speaking, it 
was the defeat of the Polish Army, not 
the bombing of Warsaw, that defeated 
the Poles. Rotterdam was bombed as 
part of the military offensive and, it 
was claimed, as a “mistake” after the 
city had surrendered, and had no real 
campaign significance. The Battle of 
Britain was militarily important in 
the war; the Battle of London was 
not. There was moral outrage against 
the Germans for the Blitz, but it was 
accepted as St. Exupéry had predicted 
it would be. The British certainly had 
no doubt about what they wanted 
to do to Germany. Despite the scale 
of their effort they failed to conquer 
by terror and achieved a debatable 
success in the strategic or military 
sense, and any reader of Albert 
Speer’s diary knows.56 To be sure 
Speer thought that concentrated 
simultaneous attacks on all ball-
bearing factories would have brought 
German industry to its knees. He 
was ambivalent towards the effect 
of area bombardment. I am not 
suggesting here that the Germans 
would have hesitated to obliterate 
London if they had had the power. I 
am not advocating German morality 
as opposed to British. I am simply 
saying that the moral indifference 
to mass bombing was international, 
and also that, until Hiroshima, it was 
based on the questionable premise of 
efficiency.
 Two other aspects remain. 
The first is the fact that the British 
Government was more concerned 
to give an impression of reasonable 
behaviour than it was to carefully 
delineate important targets. Perhaps 
the nature of the weapons available, 
and the slow progress towards 
their most efficient use, dictated 
strategy, but Churchill considered the 
ramifications of terror bombing and 
deliberately chose it. It was discussed 
many times in British decision-
making circles. On 30 October 1940, 
in the War Cabinet and Churchill 
argued that, “whilst we should 
adhere to the rule that our objective 
should be military targets, at the 
same time the civilian population 
around target areas must be made 
to feel the weight of the war.”57 
The War Cabinet approved what 
they specifically termed “the Prime 
Minister’s Proposal.” To say the least, 
Harris did not try to dissuade him. It 
was only the shock waves of Dresden 
that caused Churchill to cringe a 
little. Harris did not cringe.58 I think, 
however, that enough has been said 
here so that one can see that it was 
a whole background of theory and 
practice that developed the mind-set 
with which the air war was fought. 
In this sense Harris was a proponent 
and agent of an accepted way of 
waging air war, and it is manifestly 
unfair to saddle him with special 
moral opprobrium, when manifestly 
he was merely carrying out the wish 
of his country men, both in Whitehall 
and in the streets, when the subject 
is looked at from a national point of 
view.
 For it cannot be too strongly 
emphasized that very few objected 
in public. I have named them in 
England. In Canada, Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King thought that more 
airmen waging war by terror would 
have saved many lives and money for 
Canada.59 The Minister of State for 
Air, C.G. “Chubby” Power, stated that 
the matter had never been discussed 
in Canada’s wartime cabinet.60 There 
was a consensus. No Canadian 
churchmen objected.61 When Cologne 
got its 1,000 bomber raid in 1942 
the Globe & Mail stated that it was a 
good way to deal with that “Hunnish 
hive.” It also said that of the 1,000 
Canadians thought to have assisted 
in that precedent-making operation, 
none, “we may be sure, shirked their 
duty!”62 No doubt!
 To quote Vonnegut:
‘It had to be done,’ Rumfoord told 
Billy, speaking of the destruction 
of Dresden.
‘I know,’ said Billy.
‘That’s war.’
‘I know. I’m not complaining.’
‘It must have been hell on the 
ground.’
‘It was,’ said Billy Pilgrim.
‘Pity the poor men who had to 
do it.’
‘I do.’
‘You must have had mixed 
feelings, there on the ground.’
‘It was all right,’ said Billy. 
‘Everything  is all  right, and 
everybody has to do exactly what 
he does…’
So it goes.63
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